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a warranty, yet, where representations are made by the vendor, of
the quality of the thing sold, or its fitness for a particular purpose,
if intended as a part of the contract of sale, and the vendee makes
the purchase relying upon such representations, they will in law
constitute a contract of warranty. The evidence detailed in the
exceptions had a tendency to establish such a contract, and it would
have been error, by any ruling- of the court, to have deprived the
plaintiff of the benefit of it. Upon the claim made by the -defend-
ants, that there had been an acceptance of the machinery by the
.plaintiff, and a waiver of all defects in it, the charge was more
favorable to the defendants than it should have been. Return 6f
the property to the vendor, or notice of its defects, is never neces-
sary, except to enable the vendee to withhold or recover back the
price upon the actual disaffirmance of the contract, and thereby
revesting the title in the vendor. But where there is a contract
of warranty, the vendee is under no legal obligation to return the
property, or to give notice of its defects ; he has a right of action
by proving the contract and its breach, and his retention and user
of the property, and neglect to give notice to the vendor of its de-
fects, are only material-upon the question of damages. The claim
of the defendants that it was part of the agreement that their me-
chanic should set up the machine, does not seert to us to be supported
by the evidence, and all the benefit the defendants could legally claim
from any unskilfulness in setting up or using the machine, was fully
given themby the charge. Judgment affirmed.
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ACCRETION. See Riparian Owner.
Meandered Lake or Pond-Retirement of Water-Question of sud-
den or grddual Change.-The owner of land bounded by any mean-
dered lak or pond in this state, takes, as such, no fee in the bed or soil
1 From Hon. D. M. Bates, Reporter; to appear in 2 Delaware Chan. Reports.
9 From A. N. Martin, Esq., Reporter: to appear in 55 Indiana Reports.
3 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter ;- to appear in 45 Maryland Reports.
4 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 11 Rhode Island Reports.
5 From Hon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter; to appear in 49 Verniont Reports.
6 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 42 Wisconsin'Reports.
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under the water, but has a right to accretions formed by slow and imper-
ceptible degrees upon or against his land, and to those portions of the
bed of the lake or pond adjoining his land, which may be uncovered in
the same manner by reliction of the waters: Boorman v. Sunnucws, 42
Wis.
The other rights, also belonging to the riparian owner as such, upon
a navigable lake, such as that of access to and from the lake upon his
land, that of building wharves and piers in aid of navigation, and that
of having the waters flow to his land without artificial obstruction, belong
to the riparian owner upon any meandered lake in this state, whether
actually navigable or not, so far as they can be applied: Id.
The riparian rights above defined are subject to the paramount right
of the public to use navigable lakes or ponds for the purposes of com-
merce and navigation : Id.
One who claims land by reliction, should show the several stages of
the process through longer or shorter periods, as determined by the
width of the strip uncovered or by comparison with the bank or other
known and fixed objects, so that the court may have definite and satis-
factory data upon which to determine the character of the reliction;
and it was error in this case to determine such a claim in favor of the
claimant upon mere proof that persons watching the process could not
see the water recede : Id.
The pond here in question, when originally surveyed, had an area of
160 acres, and a depth of four or five feet. By the spring of 1874, a
strip of the original bed, several rods in width, bad become bare; and
the depth of the water remaining was a little more than one foot. In
the summer following, the water entirely disappeared. A little water
gathered there in the spring of 1875, but soon disappeared; and the
pond seems to have permanently dried up. Upon evidence of these facts,
the court intimates an opinion that as to that portion of the lake bed,
which was laid bare after the firstmentioned date, the water disappeared
too suddenly and sensibly to vest the title in the riparian owner; but it
was not necessary to decide that question on this appeal : Id.
Whether the United States or this state is the owner of that part of
said lake bed (if any) to which the former riparian owner may fail to
show title by reliction, is not here considered; plaintiff's right to the
equitable relief sought, being dependent upon proof of his own title: Rd.
ACTION.
Voluntary Payment-Liquor License.-Tn an action to recover mon-
eys, paid by the plaintiff, to the defendant, a town, for a license to sell
intoxicating liquors, under an invalid, penal ordinance of the latter,
adopted under a void statute, the complaint averred that such payment
was made " for the purpose of avoiding the penalty and forfeiture," &e.,
"and to save himself from arrest and imprisonment for violating the
provisions of said ordinance, as provided fbr by statute :" Held, that
siAch complaint does not show that such payment was not voluntary, and
is therefore bad on demurrer for want of sufficient facts: Towr of Brazil
v. Kress, 55 Ind.
The cases of The Town of Princeton v. Vierling, 40 Ind. 340, and
The Town of Ligonier v. Acherman. 46 Ind. 552, are overruled, in so
far as they conflict with the above decision : rd.
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ADMINISTRATOR. See Executor.
ADVANCEMENT.
The question of advancement can only arise in cases of total intestacy
Pole v. Simmons & Pole, E'rs, et al., 45 Md.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
Credits bn Official Bonds-Sureties.-The general rule of law as to
the appropriation of credits is, that fhe debtor has the right, if he pleases,
to make the appropriation. If he omit to do so, the creditor may make
it. If both omit, the law will apply the payments according to its own
notions of justice; and, in cases of long and running accounts, where
debts and credits are perpetually occurring and no balances are other-
wise adjusted than for the mere purpose of making rests, payments ought
to be applied to extinguish the debts according to the priority of time;
so that the credits are to be deemed payments pro tanto of the debts
antecedently due: Pickering v. Day, 2 Del. Ch.
An exception to such general rule is the case of several official bonds
executed by a collector or receiver of public revenue, at different times,
with distinct sets of sureties. In such case in the absence of any appro-
priation of payments made by the parties, money collected under a sub-
sequent bond will not, before it is discharged, be applied in payment
of a prior one; but a court of equity will so appropriate the payments
as to give each bond credit for the money due and collected under it:
Id.
An apportionment of the amounts due on several successive official
bondsrespectively, endorsed on the bonds and signed by the sureties
therein, is conclusive, in'the absence of fraud or mistake: Id.
Mistake, to avoid an agreement, must be a mistake, not of law but of
fact; and it must be a plain mistake, clearly made out by satisfactory
proof, not resting upon evidence loose, equivocal or contradictory: Id.
The omission of a collector of public revenue to remove a deputy col-
lector, after knowledge of default by the latter, does not discharge the
sureties of deputy collector: Id.
The provision of the Act of Congress of June 30th 1864, that a col-
lector of internal revenue shall, before entering upon the duties of his
-office, execute an official bond, does not apply to collectors appointed
under a prior act and who are continued in office under a saving clause
in such act: id.
Provisions in statutes for the taking of official bonds, are directory
only and not conditions precedent to the exercise of the office, unless
expressed to be such.: Id.
AsSUMPSIT.
Suit for Money paid for use of another.-In a suit to recover for
money alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff, to t third person, for
and at the request of the defendant, it is immaterial as to whether such
third person had or had not a valid claim upon the defendant for such
or any sum of money. But to recover therefor, the plaintiff must estab-
lish the facts that he had made such payments, and that it was made
on the authority of the defendant: Lucas v. Jarrell, E'r., 55 Ind.
Where A. subscribes a certain sum of money, for a certaifi purpose,
to be paid, on a certain condition, to B., who is to procure therewith, a
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'certain writing for A.; and B., without the express request of A.,
advances such sum, and procures such writing for A., and then institutes
suit for such sum, against A., the latter may introduce evidence that
such condition has never been performed; but, in the absence of ptoof
of such request, or proof of the performance of such condition, B. can-
not introduce such writing in evidence : .d.
ATTORNEY. See Corporation.
BANKRUPTCY.
Discharge of Banript-Contribution between Sureties-Tort-Tres-
pass-Oflcer.-Where a judgment has been rendered, upon a promis-
sory note, against the principal maker thereof and his sureties as such,
and subsequent to the payment of such judgment by one of such sure-
ties the other is adjudged and discharged-as a bankrupt, in a proceed-
ing in a district court of the United States, the claim of such paying
surety upon- the bankrupt surety for contribution is not one exempted
by the bankrupt law of the United States from, but is included in, the
operation of such discharge; and such paying surety and an officer
holding an execution on such judgment, for the benefit of such paying
surety, may be enjoined from selling the property of such bankrupt,
on such execution: Hays v. Ford et al, 55 Ind.
A judgment for damages for a tort, rendered against a person prior to
the commencement of proceedings against him, wherein he is finally dis-
charged as a bankrupt, is embraced in such discharge: Id.
Where, upon a judgment rendered against a duly dischdrged Imnk-
rupt before such discharge the creditor subsequently causes a writ to
be issued to, and the goods of such bankrupt seized thereon by, the
proper officer, the creditor is liable to such bankrupt ab initio, as a tres-
passer, whether he knew of the discharge of such bankrupt or not, but
such officer will be protected by such writ, if regular upon its face: Id.
Where, to avoid the payment of a debt due from him to another,
before his discharge as a bankrupt, the latter undertakes to avail him-
self of such discharge, it is only necessary for him to plead such dis-
charge by a general averment thereof; and a certified copy of the judg-
ment of the court decreeing such discharge, under the hand of the judge
thereof, and authenticated by its seal, is conclusive evidence thereof:
Id.
Promise to pay the Debt of a third Person- Claim provable in Bank-
ruptcy.-A mere promise to pay the debt of a third person, without any
new or superadded consideration moving to the promisor from the
plaintiff, is within the Statute of Frauds, and to be binding, must be in
writing, and must state the consideration; but it is not necessary to
allege in the declaration that the promise is in writing; it is sufficient
if that appear in proof at the trial: Ecker v. Bohn, 45 Md.
Before proceedings in bankruptcy have been commenced, a creditor
nay take from a third person a contract, covenant or security for the
payment of money, as an induceiient to forbear instituting proceedings"
in bankruptcy against his debtor, without violating any provision of the
Bankrupt Act, or contravening public policy: Id.
A promise to pay the debt of a third person, in consideration that his
creditor would abstain from instituting proceedings to have him declared
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a bankrupt, furnishes no sufficient cause of action, the creditor having
at the time the promise was made, no right to proceed in bankruptcy
against his debtor: Id.
Mere liability as surety for a bankrupt, does not constitute a claim
which may be proved against him under the Bankrupt Act. The debt
must be actually paid by the surety before he has a claim provable in
bankruptcy: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Endorsement cannot he varied by Parol.-One who has endorsed a note
in blank -without qualmeation expressed in the writing, cannot show by
parol, as against the person to whom he delivered it, a contemporaneous
agreement between them that he should not be liable as endorser, where
nu mistake or fraud in Drocuring the endorsement is alleged: Charles v.
Denis, 42 Wis.
CHARITABLE USES.
Not within Laws against Perpetuities-Jurisdction of Jiancery.-
Charitable uses are not within the rule of law against perpetuities : The
State v. *Grffith, 2 Del. Oh.
A devise of real estate, with a direction that the same be not sold but
rented, "the proceeds arising from such rents" to be applied to.xertain
charitable uses; Held not be within the law gainst perpetuities : Id.
Prior to the English statute of 9 Geo. 2, charitable uses in England
were subject to no restriction: Id.
The English mortmain acts did not extend to the British colonies: Id.
Tie Delaware statute of 17 Geo. 2, for the relief of religious societies,
&c., considered; its history and objects. The prohibitions in this statute
against testamentary gifts of real estate to religious societies do not affect
charitable uses generally : Id.
A devise to certain charitable uses of a fund, to be distributed "by
agents, to be appointed by tfie Orphans' Court or th6 -Levy Court of
Kent county, as may be deemed most proper," is not void for uncertainty
as to which one of the two courts shall appoint the agents.- Either court
may exercise the .power of appointment. If both refuse, this court will
appoint. So, were the power of appointment void -for uncertainty, this
court would have power to create the necessary agency: Id..
Distinction between limitations of the legal estate and limitations by
way of trust, with respect to the degree of certainty requisite in the
objects to take : Id.
A devise of lands in trust " to and for the support, maintenance and
education of the poor white citizens of Kent county generally," coupled
with a direction that no part of the bequest should "be applied to the
use or benefit of any person or persons residing within the walls of the
Poor House, but to be distributed amongst such only of the poor who
by timely issistance may be kept from being carried to the Poor House
and becoming subjects thereof," is not void for uncertainty in the
description of the objects: Rd.
Uncertainty of persons until appointment or selection is characteristic
of a charitable use : Id.
An equitable interest vests in the beneficiaries of a charitable use, from
the time of their appointment or selection; such as entities them to
enforce their equitable rights: Id.
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The jurisdiction of the court of chancery to protect and enforce
charitable uses considered at large and sustained. Such jurisdiction in
England, existed in the court of chancery prior to the statute of 43
Elizabeth, and is not founded on that statute: Id.
The cases of Baptist Association v. flart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1, and
Vidal et al. v. Girard's Ez'rs, 2 How. U. S. 127, reviewed: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Nelience-Sale- Vesting of Title.-A carrier of freight is as against
the acts of the shipper, bound to the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence only. Thus, where plaintiff loaded heavy machinery upon a
platform car, and blocked its wheels with insufficient blocking insecurely
nailed, by reason whereof the machinery, while being transported by
defendant, broke from its fastenings without fault of defendant in the
running of the train or in maintenance of the track, and was injured,
it was held, that defendant was not liable therefor, although-its yard-mas-
ter and forwarder of freight cars saw the fastenings and noticed their
insufficiency before the injury was done: Ross v. Troy & Boston Rail-
road Co., 49 Verm.
The shipper of the machinery, who lived in R., was under contract to
erect a building for the consignees, in P., and furnish it with machinery
for a gross sum, the consignees paying freight on the machinery. Held,
that the shipper might maintain an action against the carrier for injuries
done to the machinery while in transit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Venue.
CORPORATION.
Ultra vires.-A corporation was created by the legislature of Rhode
Island under the name of the W. Co. Nothing in the act of incorpora-
tion specified the business to be done, nor did anything in the corporate
name suggest it. All its stock was held by a single stockholder. The
corporation entered into a partnership with A. to be terminated at will
.by the corpoiation. Held, that the partnership was not .ultra vires on
the part of the corporation : Alen..v. Woonsocket Co., 11 R. I.
Semble, that if A. was to have no control as partner, and was to re-
ceive part profits for his services, the partnership could not on any prin-
ciple be ultra vires on the part of the corporation : Id.
Service-Acccptance by Attorney.-Where a statute provided that
tervice upon a corporation should be upon "the president or any director
or manager or other officer," an attorney is not such officer : Northern.
Central Railroad Co. v. Rider, 45 Md.
Where an attorney endorsed upon a writ "service admitted, B. C.,
Att'y," but did not enter an appearance, and judgment was entered by
default against the corporation: Held, that service on an attorney not
being sufficient, his admission could not have any greater effect than an
actual service on him, but that as an attorney is presumed to have
authority to waive service by entering an appearance, the memorandum
of service admitted should be taken as a waiver and treated as an appear-
ance, and the judgment by default was therefore erroneous: Id.
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COVENANT.
To p~ay Taxes.-Covenant by lessee "to pay the taxes of every name
and kind that should be assessed on the premises at any time during the
said term," does not cover an assessment for benefits accruing from street
improveiients : Beals v. Providence Rubber Co., 11 1. I.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Error in the Sentence of a Prisoner-Power of the Court of Appeals.-
Where a sentence not authorized by law has been imposed upon a pri-
soner, a court of error can only reverse the judgment; it has no power to
impose the proper sentence, or to remand the case to the court of original
jurisdiction for that purpose. No such power existed at common law,
and unless conferred by statute it cannot be assumed: lcDonald v. The
State, 45 Md.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Voluntary Conveyance in Fraud of Creditors-Marshalling of Rcze-
dies.-A voluntary conveyance, though without a fraudulent intent, is
void, as against creditors, under the statute of 1 Elizabeth. Such a
conveyance is void if it tend to hinder and delay creditors, though it
may not otherwise injure them: Logan, v. Brick, 2 Del. Oh.
A creditor having the security of two funds out of which he can sat-
isfy his debt, upon one of which only another creditor has a junior lieu,
will be compelled in equity to resort first to the fund which the junior
creditor cannot reach : Id.
EQUITY. See Debtor and Creditor; Landlord and Tenant; Set-off.
Remedy at Law not always a Bar.-Equity will, in some cases, decree
the performance of a general covenant of indemnity, though it sounds
only in damages, upon the principle on which the court entertains bills
quia timet: Reynold v. Herdman, Sheriff, et al., 2 Del. Oh.
EVIDENCE. See Husband and Wife.
Admissions for the purpose of Compromise.-Evidence of admissions
made on the occasion of an attempted compromise of a pending contro-
versy, if of a fact admitted because it is a fact, and not because the party
admitting it is willing to treat it as one to effect a settlement, is admissi-
ble : Doon v. Ravey, 49 Verm.
Letter.-Where a person to whom a letter was addressed, has been
dead for several years, leaving no personal representative of whom in-
quiry could be made, concerning it, and the letter is not shown to have
been of such importance as to require its preservation,.it may well be
presumed-that the letter has been lost or destroyed, and secondary evi-
dence of the address written on it, may be admitted: Jones v. Jones,
45 Md. -
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
Powers of Administrator.-An administrator succeeding an executor
takes only the powers inherent in the executor's office. Special powers
given the executor do not go to such an administrator, unless the will
explicitly or implicitly continues them to such administrator: Belcher
v. Branch, 11 R. I.
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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See lBankruptcy.
Verbal Promise-Satsfaction of Execution.-A verbal promise by
one person to the creditor of an execution on a judgment against a third
person, that, if such creditor- will satisfy execution, such promisor will
deliver certain personal property, and pay a sum of money to such cred-
itor, is not a promise to pay the debt of another, and is not within the
Statute of Frauds, but is a valid contract, for a breach of which an action
'may be maintained and damages recovered by such creditor, upon his
satisfying such execution : Paner v. Blain, 55 Ind.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Personal Property of Married Woman-Reduction to Possession by
Husband.-Plaintiff, while covert, recovered judgment against a town in
the name of herself and husband, for personal injuries caused by an
insufficient 'highway. The judgment was paid to the attorney by a town
order drawn in his favor. The attorney endorsed the order to plaintiff's
husband, in the husband's last illness, and the husband delivered it
immediately to plaintiff, saying, "This is yours, take care of it," and
plaintiff put it with other papers belonging to the husband. It had pre-
viously been agreed between the plaintiff and her husband that the pro-
ceeds of the judgment should be applied in payment of a mortgage upon.
their homestead, and that the homestead should be conveyed to plaintiff.
The husband's administrator took the order with other papers, and col-
lected the money thereon. Held, that the husband did nothing to con-
vert the judgment nor its proceeds to his own use, and that the order
remained the property of the plaintiff: Perry v. Wheelock, 49 Verm.
Wife's Chose in Action-Husband's Failure to reduce to Possession-
Yusts.-A legacy charged upon land was bequeathed to a married wo-
man, subject to the deduction of a book account held by the testator
against her. The testator held a note of the legatee's husband, but no
reference to this note was made in the bequest. The husband also be-
came indebted to the executor of the testator for goods purchased at a
vendue of the personal estate. The husband died before the wife, with-
out having reduced the legacy into his possession and without any settle-
ment with the executor touching the same or his own indebtedness to the
estate of the testator : Held, that on a bill filed by the administrator of
t1 e wife (who had survived her husband and died) to recover the legacy
from the devisee of the land charged, the husband's indebtedness to the
estate of the testator could not be treated as payment of the legacy:
Gartmell v. Perk'ns, 2 Del. Ch.
The mere omission of a husband to reduce his wife's chose in action
into his possession, for a lapse of time ordinarily sufficient to raise a pre-
suniption of payment, dbes not raise such presumption, so as to bar the
wife's right, by survivorship, to recover such chose in action after the
husband's death: Id.
Marriage, Presumptions as to.-In a case involving the question of
marriage, where there is no impediment to marriage, and the connec-
tion between the parties was illicit in its commencement, it will be
presumed to continue to be of the same character; and in order to over-
conie that presumption it will be necessary to adduce other evidence
VoL. XXV.--8
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than that of the cohabitation of the parties to estiblish their marriage:
Jones et al. v. Jones, 45 Md.
If after the birth of a person claiming to be the legitimate child of
his parents, though born as a bastard, there be cohabitation of his fither
and mother, the latter assuming the name of the former, and the parties
treat each other as man and wife, and treat the claimant as their child,
and they are treated as, and reputed to be man and wife by their friends
and acquaintances, these are facts proper to be submitted to the jury,
from which marriage may be inferred, notwithstanding the original illicit
connection between the parties: 11.
The presumption of marriage will not arise from the cohabitation of a
man with a woman, if during her life and without any proof of a divorce,
he marries another woman: Id.
On questions of marriage, births, deaths, &c., entries in a family Bible
or Testament are admissible, even without proof that they.have been ,
made by a relative, provided the book is produced from the proper cus-
tody. Proof of the handwriting or authorship of the entries is not re-
quired, when the book is shown to have been the family Bible or Testa-
ment : Id.
INFANT. See MAaster and Servant.
Fraud.-Infancy is a bar to an action on the case for false and fraud-
ulent representations by a vendor or pledgor as to his ownership of
property sold or pledged: Doran v. Smith, 49 Verm.
Contract- Disafirmance- .arrmiage Contract.-Where an infant
judgment creditor, by the promise of the judgment defendant and his
replevin bail, that, upon her entering satisfaction of such judgment, the
former will marry her, is. induced, upon that consideration alone, to enter
such satisfaction, she may, upon her arriving at the age of twenty-one
years, and upon the failure of said defendant to marry her, disaffirm such
contract, and in a suit against such judgment defendant and his replevin
bail, have such entry of satisfaction vacated, notwithstanding the fact
that at the time of making such marriage contract she was of the age of
"eighteen years : Reish v. Thompson, 55 Ind.
INNKEEPER.
Neglgence.-Defendant, an innkeeper, but declared against as bailee
for hire, by himself or servants, hitched plaintiff's horse, which was in
his care, next a horse that he or his servants knew to be in the habit
of kicking other horses, whereby plaintiff's horse was kicked and injured.
.eld, though plaintiff knew where his horse was hitched, and made no
objection thereto, but did not know of the vicious habit of the other
horse, that defendant was guilty of actionable negligence as such bailee
in thus hitching plaintiff's horse: Clary v. Willey, 49 Verm.
JUDGMENT.
Extent of Estoppel.-The estoppel of judgment on a verdict applies
in the case of title to realty only to those portions of the realty whereof
the title was formally put in issue: City of Providence r. Adams, 11
R.I.
United States District Courts-How attached Collaterally-Jurisdic-
tion-Presumption.-Where a judgment, rendered by a district court
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of the United States, not showing upon its face a lack of jurisdiction of
such court, over the parties to or subject-matter of the cause so adjudi-
cated, comes in question, collaterally, in an action in a court of this
state, it will be presumed, until the contrary is affirmatively shown by
plea, that such district court had such jurisdiction: Hays v. Ford et
al., 55 Ind.
Powoer of Court over, after the Term-Setting aside Eecution.-
After the lapse of four and a half years from the entry of judgment, the
court has no power to set it aside for a mere irregularity-as for want
of notice of the taxation of costs-even where the judgment defendant
had no knowledge or notice of its entry until about the time of his appli-
cation to vacate ; but it may set aside a sale upon execution under such
judgmeiit, for sufficient cause shown : Grede v. Dannenfelser, 42 Wis.
Applications to set aside sales on execution" for irregularities are largely
addressed to the discretion of the court, but that discretion should be
exercised so as to secure the ends of justice ; and (with a view to those
ends) full weight will sometimes be given to technical irregularitiesid.
Real estate of a judgment defendant residing in another county was
sold on execution in 1873, and in 1876 the sheriff executed a deed to
the purchaser, without having filed a duplicate certificate of the sale in
the proper register's office; the judgment defendant had no knowledge
of the entry of judgment or of the execution, levy or sale until after
the issue of the deed; and the land, which was worth $1100, was sold
for $186, the amount of the judgment debt, including costs. Reld, that
the sale should be set aside on defendant's paying the latter amount,
with interest at ten per cent: Id.
LACHES. See Landlord and Tenant.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Lease for Ninety-nine Years, Renewal for ever-Equity w71 delieve
the Owner who has failed to obtain a Renewal-Laches.-W here the
original term of a lease for ninety-nine years, renewable for ever, has
expired, and the owner of the leasehold interest has failed to obtain a
renewal within the term, according to the literal wording of the covenant
for renewal, equity will relieve him, and compel the owner of the rever-
sion to execute a new lease, provided the application be made in a rea-
sonable time, and all arrearages of ground-rent and the renewal fine be
first paid: Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md.
But gross laches on the part of the owner of the leasehold interest in
making his demand for a new lease after the term has expired, and in
seeking his remedy, will, as in other cases, be an insuperable bar to
relief in equity: Id.
LEASE.
Uncertainty-A written agreement under seal, for the lease of a store
for a term certain at a fixed rent, contained the following words: "The
said A. D. (the lessee,) to have the preference of renting said property
so long thereafter as it shall be rented for a store." In an action for the
breach of this stipulation in the contract, it was held, that the stipulation
was void and inoperative for uncertainty : Delashmutt v. Thomas, 45 Md.
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LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See fiusband and Wife.
When it begins to run as. to Partners.-Lindley's statement (Partner-
ship, vol. ii. 1024) adopted: that the statute has no application "so long
as a partnership is existing, and each partner is exercising his rights,
and enjoying his own property; but that it begins to run" as soon as a
partnership is dissolved, or there is any exclusion of one partner by the
other: Allen v. Woonsocket Co., 11 R. I.
MARRIAGE. See Husband and Wife ; Infant.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Negligence-Hazardous Employment-Infant.-In an action by an em-
ployee against his employer to recover damages for inji4ries suffered by
the former, whilst in the employment of the latter, one paragraph of the
complaint alleged, that the defendant, being a contractor engaged in the
construction of a railroad, employed the plaintiff, a minor, of the age of
but fifteen years, to assist in certain non-hazardous work; but, that the
defendant, without giving to the plaintiff sufficient caution, warning or
instruction, placed the latter in control of a wild, fractious and ungovern-
able horse, in a narrow, unsafe and dangerous space between two trains
of cars, moved by steam power in opposite directions, upon a high
embankment; and that the plaintiff, whilst exercising due care and
engaged in such hazardous employment, was thrown beneath and injured
by one of said trains of cars. Held, on demurrer for want of sufficient
facts, that the paragraph was sufficient: Hill et at. v. Gust, 55 Ind.
Where an employer places an employee of tender years, at work, in a
dangerous place, the former is bound to give to the latter due caution
and instruction. And if the employee, whilst so employed, be injured,
the fact that he could, by the use of his eyesight, have seen that such
place was dangerous, is not sufficient evidence to hold such employee
accountable f6r contributory negligence in causing such injury; the
question of negligence being one for the jury to determine from all the
facts : Id.
MORTGAGE. See Partition.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Liability forDamages from change of Grade.-In the absence of a
statute creating such liability, a municipal corporation is not liable for
damages resulting from an authorized change in the grade of a street,
made with reasonable skill and care: Dore v. The City of Milwaukee,
42 Wis.
If a statute requires compensation for injuries in such cases, and pro-
vides specific means for recovering it, other than an ordinary civil action,
the statutory xemedy is exclusive: .d.
In case of injuries to a city lot from the alteration of the grade of a
street made pursuant to an unauthorized or illegal order of the city council,
the city is liable in an ordinary civil action for damages: Id.
Pleading-Presumption.-In. an action against a town, the contrary
not appearing by the complaint or otherwise, it will be presumed that
such defendant was incorporated under the general law of this state, for
the incorporation of towns: Town of Brazil v. Kress, 55 Ind."
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
NAVIGABLE STREAM.
What constitutes-Oapacity tofloat Logs.-Under the uniform decis-
ions of this court, one who owns both banks of a stream, navigable or
unnavigable, has title to the bed of the stream. (A suggestion by Dix-
ON, C. J., in WMs. R. I Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61, and Wright v. Dag,
33 Id. 260, as to the effect of certain federal decisions on the subject
criticised.): Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis.
It is the settled law of this state, that streams of sufficient capacity to
float logs to market are navigable; and it is not essential to the public
casement that this capacity be continuous throughout the year, but it is
sufficient that the stream have periods of navigable capacity ordinarily
recurring from year to year, and continuing long enough to make it
useful as a highway: 
L.
If the capacity of a stream is such that it can be used as a highway
without trespass upon the banks, the right of the public therein is not
affected by the fact that such trespass is convenient and habitual: .id.
The right of A. to float his logs down a navigable stream, unimpeded
by the dam of B., is not affected by the lawfulness or unlawfulness of
A.'s dam on the same stream: Id.
NEGLIGENC4. See Innkeeper; Master and Servant.
OFFICER. See Bankruptcy.
OFFICIAL BONDS. See App liration of Payments.
PARTITION.
Owelty-fortgage of undivided Interet.-When owelty is required
to equalize partition between two tenants in common, the estate of one
being mortgaged, it should, if to be paid by the unencumbered owner,
be paid to the mortgagee of the other and credited on the mortgage note:
Green v. Arnold, 11 R. I.
On a bill in equity for partition between two tenants in common, the
estate of one being unencumbered and that of the other being subject to
various mortgages covering the mortgagor's undivided interest in various
parcels; Held, that a decree of partition could not extend any mort-
gage to property not described and included in such mortgage : Id.
Held, further, that the aggregate parcels covered by each single mort-
gage of the one tenant in common must, for purposes of partition, be
considered as one separate estate: Id.
Held, further, that as between tenants in common a sale or mortgage
by one of them is valid, provided such sale or mortgage covers the ven-
dor's or mortgagor's interest in the whole of any separate parcel oi estate,
notwithstanding the tenancy in common may extend to other parcels or
estates: Id.
Of two tenants in common one mortgages his interest in the common
estate to the other and no entry or foreclosure has taken place. Held,
the mortgagee can have partition in equity: Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Limitations, Statute of
Note given in Firm Name by one Partner-Death of Partner.-In an
action against G. and others upon a promissory note, where no ground
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of recovery against the defendants was alleged or attempted to be shown
other than that they were partners, or had held themselves out to the
world as such, and that the note had been made by G. in the firm name.,
for the price of chattels delivered to him by the plaintiff, it was error to
instruct the jury that it was "unnecessary to decide whether G. had
power to execute a promissory note in the name of the firm or not ;" and
that "if on any ground, G. had authority to purchase the chattels on the
credit of himself and the other defendants, plaintiff was entitled to recover
against the defendants: Sherman v. Kreul, 42 Wis.
Where one of several joint obligors (in this case partners liable on a
firm note) dies, the legal remedy is against the survivors only, and the
estate of the decedent is discharged at law; though his administrator
may be proceeded against in equity upon showing that the remedy against
the survivors has been exhausted, or that they are insolvent: Id.
But where, during the pendency of an action against alleged partners
upon'an alleged obligation of the firm, one of- the defendants died, and
his administrators asked and obtained leave- to defend, filed a separate
answer, and litigated the cause upon the merits: Zeld, that this was a
waiver of all objections to the plaintiff's right to proceed against the
estate at law instead of in equity; though in order to recover against
the administrators, plaintiff must allege (by supplementary complaint),
and must prove, that the surviving obligor is insolvent: Td.
PLEADING. See Municipal Corporation.
POSSESSION. See Trespass.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See Accretion.
Rqhts of- Wharf-Protect ion of Bank-Purresture.-Riparian
rights proper rest upon title to the bank of the water, and are the same
whether the.riparian owner own the soil. under the water or not. And
distinguished from the right arising in case of gradual and insensible
accretion or'relicton, the general right of occupying the soil under the
water, when such right exists, is not properly a riparian right; resting
not upon title to the bank only, but more directly upon title to the soil
under the water: D9ietrich v. N. V. Union Railroad Co., 42 Wis.
Distinguished from appropriation and odbupation of the soil under the
water, a riparian owner upon navigable water, whether or not he own
the soil to the thread of the stream, has a right (unless prohibited by
local law) to construct in shoal water in front of his land, proper wharves
or piers, in aid of navigation, and at his peril of obstructing navigation,
through the water far enough to reach actually, navigable water: Id.
As a right of necessity, whenwater, navigable or not navigable, is by
natural causes wearing away and intruding upon its banks, the riparian
owner, whgther or not he own the soil to the thread of the stream, may,
as against -the public, at his peril of obstructing the public use when the
water is navigable, and at his peril of the necessity, intrude as far as may
be necessary to protect his land against the action of the water: .id.
In the case of navigable waters, any extension of possession, or intru-
sion into the water, beyond the natural shore, other than those mentioned
in the foregoing propositions, whether by the riparian owner or a stranger,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
without express and competent grant from the public, is a purpresture,
vesting no title in the person who makes it : Id.
Rights of-Navigable Stream and Lake.-It is the settled law of this
state, that the proprietor of lands on a navigable stream takes usgue ad
filum aqam, subject to the public right of navigation, which includes
the right of the public to improve, regulate and control the bed of the
stream, and the flow of the waters therein, in the interest of navigation
and commerce: Delaplaine v. C. & N. W. Railway Co., 42 Wis.
The riparian proprietor upon navigable lakes and ponds takes the land
only to the water's edge : Id.
The riparian proprietQr upon a navigable lake has, as such, the exclu-
sive right of access to and from the lake in front of his land, and of
building there piers and wharves in aid of navigation, not interfering
with the public easement: and these private rights grow out of his title
to the land, and have a pecuniary value : and their destruction or mate.
rial abridgement is in general an injury, entitling him to redress : Id.
Plaintiffs own lots abutting upon a navigable lake in this state; and
defendant, without th 9 ir consent, constructed its railway within the
water of the lake, but so near the front of their lots as to cut off their
access to the body of the lake, leaving along such front a pool of stagnant
water; and by reasori thereof, said lots have been greatly depreciated.
.eid, that plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for the injury.
Chapman v. 0. & M. Railway Co., 33 Wis, 629, approved and followed:
Id.
SET-OFF.
Of Judgments.-A judgment debtor, having recovered a judgment
in another court against his creditor, is entitled to relief in equity by a
decree for set-off: Webster v. McDaniel, 2 Del. Ch.
Though both judgments are legal demands equity will relieve, because
they are not judgments recovered in the same court, so that they could
be set off at law under the equitable control of the court over its own
judgments; and there is, therefore, no remedy but in equity: Id.
STREET. See Municipal Corporation.
SutET. See Application of.Payments; Bankruptcy.
TENANTS IN COIMON. See Partition.
TORT.
Several.-Torts are always several, whatever number of persons unite
in committing them; and though defendant and one 0. were named
together in an order of the supervisors as having encroached upon a
highway, it was not error to reject evidence offered by defendant that
he and 0. occupied in common the land to which the obstruction was
appurtenant: State v. Babcock, 42 Wis.
TRESPASS. See Bankruptcy.,
Constructive Possession-Possessory Acts.-In trespass qua. clau., it
appeared that plaintiffs had paid taxes on the locus in quo, and in sur-
veying the gore of which it was a part, had surveyed some of its outer
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lines. field, that those acts were not acts of possession, but evidence
of a claim of right merely: Paine & Sloctm v. ilutchins, 49 Verm.
The effect of possessory acts done upon parts of a gore under color of
title to the whole, will not be extended by such color of title to the other
parts: the land in the gore being at the time subject to ownership by
various persons, and occupied by them by different kinds of possession:
Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
.regllgence-Liability for Acts of Co-trustee.-I-ero negligence of a
trustee, as well as his active default, may be a breach of trust: Richards
v. Seal, 2 Del. Oh.
Ignorance of the act or default of a co-trustee is no excuse, if that
ignorance results from neglect: Id.
An investment of a trust fund having been made by trustees, one of
them without the knowledge of his co-trustee, collected the fund and
held it until his death without re-investment. Held, that the co-trustee,
who had given no attention to the fund after its original investment,
was liable: Id.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Judgment.
VENUE.
Mhange of is not Unconstitutional.-An act authorizing change of
venue to secure an impartial trial and to avoid local prejudice, is not in
violation of Art. 1, § 15, of the Constitution of the state, which declares,
"1 The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." This provision of
the Constitution not meaning "trial by jury of the vicinage or county :"
Taylor v. Gardiner, 11 R. I.
WASTE.
Cutting Timber.-The cutting of timber is an injury of an irreparable
nature and remediable in equity by whomsoever committed: Flemming
v. Collins, 2 Del. Ch.
Equity, having jurisdiction to restrain waste, will decree an account
and satisfaction for the waste committed. : ld.
Upon the death of the party committing the waste the liability to
account survives against his administrators : Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See Accretion; -ravigable Stream;
Riparian Owner.
WILL.
Signing as Witness in presence of Testator.-Under our statute, which
requires thbt a will (not nuncupative), to be valid, " shall be attested
and subscribed in the presence of the testator, by two or more competent
witnesses," no subscription to a will by a witness is valid unless made
where the testator (if he so desires, and is not blind) can see the witness
subscribe; and it is not sufficient that the witness, after signing as such
in an adjoining room outside of the testator's range of vision brings such
subscription to the attention of the testator, who assents to and approves
the act: Downie's Will, 42 Wis.
